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Abstract
We study with the help of a laboratory experiment the conditions under which an unin-
formed manipulator – a robot trader that unconditionally buys several shares of a common
value asset in the beginning of a trading period and unwinds this position later on – is
able to induce higher asset prices. We find that the average contract price is significantly
higher in the presence of the manipulator if, and only if, the asset takes the lowest possible
value and insiders have perfect information about the true value of the asset. It is also
evidenced that the robot trader makes trading gains; i.e., independently on whether the
informed traders have perfect or partial information, it earns always more than the av-
erage trader. Finally, not only uninformed subjects suffer from the presence of the robot
trader, but also some of the imperfectly informed insiders have lower payoffs once the
robot trader is added as a market participant.
Keywords: Asset Market, Experiment, Price Manipulation, Rational Expectations.
JEL-Classifications: C90, G12, G14.
1 Introduction
The efficient market hypothesis of Hayek (1945), operationalized first by Muth (1961) in
form of the rational expectations equilibrium, predicts that the price of a financial security
summarizes all information about the asset’s intrinsic value held by traders. The capacity to
aggregate information through prices makes it, in principle, possible to use security markets
to predict the likelihood of future events (see Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004), but it has also
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been argued recently that prediction markets may suffer from manipulations because some
markets participants can have incentives to incur into trading losses in order to distort,
indirectly, policies. Two newspaper articles by Pearlstein (2003) and Wyden and Dorgan
(2003) reported precisely that a prediction market with the aim to assess the probabilities
of geopolitical events was shut down because of the fear that terrorists would be willing to
distort the process of information aggregation.
The capacity of asset markets to aggregate disperse information has been analyzed exten-
sively with the help of laboratory experiments (see, among others, Forsythe et al., 1982; Plott
and Sunder, 1982, 1988; Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990; Sunder, 1992), but only little effort
has been made to assess their manipulability. In the study of Hanson et al. (2006), some
traders got an additional payoff depending on the median contract price. The authors found
that manipulators place, as expected, higher bids. The accuracy of the market, however,
remained unaffected because the other traders offset this effect. Veiga and Vorsatz (2008)
studied a short–selling constrained asset market in which subjects traded a common value
asset that took either a high or a low value. Information was distributed asymmetrically in
the sense that only three out of twelve subjects knew the actual value of the asset when the
market was open for trading. It was found that a robot trader that bought ten shares of the
asset in the beginning of the trading period and sold them afterwards again was able to in-
duce significantly higher prices whenever the actual value of the asset was low. This occurred
because some of the uninformed traders took the initial buy offers to be informative, revised
their beliefs about the actual value of the asset upwards, and drove the price even higher.1
This study provided therefore some experimental evidence for the recent theoretical finding
of Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2008) that strategic traders have incentives to mimic insiders by
moving prices initially away from the fundamentals before reversing the position later on at
1Following No¨th et al. (1999), we say that some subjects felt into an information trap; that is, these traders
had misaligned beliefs about the state (the true value of the asset) and the traders who recognized them
did not have the resources to adopt their behavior (due to short–selling constraints). Information traps are
to be distinguished from information mirages and information cascades. According to Camerer and Weigelt
(1991), an information mirage is obtained if some of the traders see information that could be there but is
not. The term information cascades, on the other hand, refers to a different decision environment. Consider
a situation in which every individual receives some private information about the state and, subsequently,
individuals have to announce publicly their guess about the actual state. Then, individuals may discard their
private information following the decisions of the former players (see, among others, Bannerjee (1992) and
Bikhchandani et al. (1992)).
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more favorable prices.2
The objective of this paper is to go one step further and analyze the conditions on the
distribution of private information such that manipulations occur. In particular, we address
the question whether manipulations happen primarily if private information is perfect or
whether similar results can also be obtained when the insiders hold partial information about
the true value of the asset (but there is no aggregate uncertainty). A priori there is no
straightforward answer to this question. Since all traders are aware about the distribution
of private information, the initial purchases of the robot trader may, on the one hand, be
considered less informative by the other traders if information is imperfect. This suggests
that manipulations are more unlikely in this case. But, on the other hand, now also partially
informed traders and not only uninformed subjects may be deceived by the manipulator.
We propose a three–by–two between subjects design to investigate this tradeoff. The
three baseline treatments, which are inspired by the study of Plott and Sunder (1988), are as
follows: twelve subjects trade a common value asset that takes the values 125, 375, and 525
ECU (experimental currency units) with equal probability for ten periods in a short–selling
constrained and computerized double auction market. Every round, each trader receives four
shares of the asset and an interest free loan of 25.000 ECU that has to be returned once the
market closes. The three baseline treatments differ only in the allocation of private infor-
mation to subjects. In the first case, six subjects are imperfectly informed about the true
value of the asset before trading starts in such a way that there is no aggregate uncertainty,
whereas the other six subjects remain uninformed; in the second case, all participants are im-
perfectly informed; and, in the last case, four subjects have perfect information about the true
value of the asset and the remaining eight subjects stay uninformed. The three manipulation
treatments differ from their associated baseline treatments since a robot trader is added as a
potential manipulator. The uninformed robot trader buys unconditionally ten shares of the
asset in the beginning of a trading period and sells them afterwards unconditionally together
with its initial endowment of four shares.
In our statistical analysis, we concentrate on the price of the asset and the payoffs of
2Further theoretical and empirical literature on market manipulations includes, among others, Allen and
Gale (1992), Benabou and Laroque (1992), Kumar and Seppi (1992), Bagnoli and Lipman (1996), Camerer
(1998), Strumpf and Rhode (2003), Hanson et al. (2004), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004), Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2007), Hanson and Oprea (2007), and Goldstein and Gu¨mbel (2008). See Veiga and Vorsatz (2008)
for a short summary.
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different groups of traders. With respect to the price of the asset, we find that the market
disseminates information better than it aggregates it and that the aggregation of information
becomes better if there are both more imperfectly informed subjects and the value of the
asset is high (Result 1). Moreover, it is evidenced that the robot trader never influences the
average last contract price, but it affects the average contract price positively if, and only
if, information is perfect and the value of the asset is 125 ECU (Result 2). This finding
has two implications. First, the manipulability of the market by means of the suggested
trading pattern is closely linked to the distribution of information since the initial purchases
of the robot are only believed to be informative if signals are perfect. Second, any successful
manipulation is of temporary nature that vanishes until the market closes.
Regarding payoffs, we may conclude that the robot trader manages to be quite profitable.
It earns always more than the representative uninformed subject, its payoff is never statisti-
cally lower than the one of the representative informed trader, and it earns significantly more
than the average trader if all subjects are imperfectly informed (Result 3). Consequently,
manipulations are individually rational. We also find, as expected, that the payoff of the
informed (uninformed) subjects is highest (lowest) when private information is perfect (Re-
sult 4). Finally, we observe that the payoff of the informed (uninformed) subjects as a group
tends to increase (decrease) thanks to the presence of the robot trader, and there is evidence
that some of the informed traders suffer from the intended manipulations: if all subjects are
imperfectly informed, those traders who receive the message that the value of the asset is not
375 ECU earn significantly less in the presence of the robot trader (Result 5).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe our
experimental design and procedures. Afterwards, we introduce the hypotheses that are tested
with the help of the experiment. In Section 4, we present our results together with the
corresponding statistical analysis. Finally, we conclude. The graphical representations of the
price paths and the experimental instructions are relegated to the Appendices.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1 Setting
We consider a three–by–two between subject design. In all three baseline treatments, twelve
subjects trade a common value asset, which takes the values 125, 375, and 525 ECU (experi-
4
mental currency units) with equal probability, for ten rounds in an electronic double auction
market. We fixed one series of values similar to the one applied by Plott and Sunder (1988)
in their market number 8 before conducting the experiment.
Every round of a session, subjects receive four shares of the asset and an interest free
loan of 25.000 ECU that has to be returned at the end of the trading period. Using these
endowments the asset is traded for five minutes in an electronic double auction market by
submitting bid and ask prices. A trade takes place whenever a subject accepts a standing
buy or sell offer. It is not possible to trade multiple units of the asset simultaneously and
short sales are not permitted.
It is common knowledge that no subject has information about the asset’s value before
the market closes in the first round of the experiment and that some subjects are privately
informed before the market opens from round two on. The first round has only been included
in our design to familiarize subjects with the trading platform and, therefore, it is excluded
from the statistical analysis later on.
In continuation, we are more specific on how private information is distributed. In treat-
ment B6, six randomly selected subjects receive some private information regarding the true
value of the asset. For example, if the actual value of the asset is 125 ECU, three subjects
get to know that the value is not 375 ECU and three subjects learn that the value is not 525
ECU. Formally, we can describe the assignment of information in this treatment as follows:
if the state space is denoted by S = {x, y, z} and the actually selected state is x, then three
traders get to know that the state is not y and three traders learn that it is not z. Hence,
private information is imperfect but there is no aggregate uncertainty. The probability to be
privately informed is the same for all subjects in all rounds. Subjects are fully aware about
how information is allocated.
Treatment B12 differs from B6 only because every subject gets partially informed. Infor-
mation is again uniformly distributed meaning that if the value of the asset is x, six subjects
learn that it is not y and six subjects get to know that it is not z. Finally, in treatment BP,
four randomly determined traders are perfectly informed (i.e., they learn the actual value of
the asset), while the other eight subjects stay uninformed.
The manipulation treatments, abbreviated by M6, M12, and MP, differ from their asso-
ciated baseline treatment due to the introduction of a computer program as an additional
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uninformed trader.3 This robot trader is active from round two on and once the market is
open for 25 seconds, it places additional random bids in the following way: 20 ECU are added
to the highest bid price to come up with a hypothetical price the robot would pay at most.
Then, a random bid between the highest bid price and the hypothetical price calculated before
is placed. So, eventually one share of the asset is bought. After a random delay time between
4 and 8 seconds, this procedure is repeated until 10 of the 48 outstanding shares are bought.
Since it may happen that the robot has a standing buy offer when it is about to place a new
bid, the old buy offer is deleted after calculating the new bid price but before placing the new
offer. In this way, it is insured that the robot has at any point in time at most one standing
buy offer. Finally, all shares (the 10 shares bought plus the endowment of 4 shares) are sold
in a similar way. The program stops automatically 50 seconds before the end of a trading
period. Table 1 below summarizes the experimental design.
Environment
Distribution of Information Baseline Manipulation
6 imperfectly informed / 6 uninformed B6 M6
12 imperfectly informed / 0 uninformed B12 M12
4 perfectly informed / 8 uninformed BP MP
Table 1: Experimental design.
2.2 Implementation
We conducted the experiment, which was programmed within the z–Tree toolbox (see Fis-
chbacher, 2007), in the computer laboratory at Maastricht University between June and
December 2007. Since all students from the Faculty of Economics and Business Administra-
tion have an e–mail account associated with their student–ID, we promoted the experiment
mainly via electronic newsletters and gave students the opportunity to register online for their
preferred session. In total, 432 unexperienced undergraduates participated in one of the 36
experimental sessions (six sessions per treatment). No student took part in more than one
session and within a given session, subjects did not know each other.
At the beginning of a session, students met outside the laboratory. We prepared cards
3In our experimental instructions, we informed subjects that an uninformed robot trader participated in the
market (i.e., the robot was not programmed conditional on the asset’s value), but the exact program structure
was not revealed. See Appendix B for a detailed description.
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with the numbers from one to twelve and let each student draw one card. If more than twelve
students showed up for a particular session, we offered three Euros in case somebody was
willing to leave. If an insufficient number of students decided to leave, we put additional
empty cards into the deck and determined the participating students randomly. Left–out
students received a compensation of 3 Euros. Finally, we reminded everybody that any kind
of communication inside the laboratory would lead to an immediate cancellation of the session.
Students then entered the laboratory and took seat in front of the computer corresponding
to the number of their card. The computers were distributed in such a way that subjects
could not see each other and, next to each computer, we placed the instructions, an official
payment receipt, and a set of control questions (see Appendix B). Subjects could study the
instructions at their own pace and eventual occurring doubts were privately clarified. The
experiment started once everybody answered all control questions correctly.
At the end of a session, subjects were paid privately one–by–one. In addition to the three
Euro show–up fee, we offered 90 Euro–cents for every 1000 ECU obtained in the experiment.
As a result, the average payment of the 90 minutes session was equal to 15.8 Euro in the
baseline treatments. The average payoff of the manipulation treatments was slightly lower
due to the partial gains of the robot trader.
3 Hypotheses
In this section, we present our experimental hypotheses. We distinguish between hypotheses
that regard the price of the asset and hypotheses related to payoffs.
3.1 Prices
Following Table 1, we divide our analysis with respect to the price of the asset into two
dimensions. The first dimension focuses on price variations between treatments when the
distribution of private information (six imperfectly informed, twelve imperfectly informed, or
four perfectly informed subjects) changes but the environment (baseline or manipulation) is
held fixed, whereas the second dimension regards price variations between treatments when
the environment changes but the distribution of information is maintained. The former
dimension therefore addresses the question whether the market can aggregate information
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as well as disseminate information and whether the aggregation of information depends on
the number of imperfectly informed traders. The latter is concerned with the manipulability
of the market.4
Regarding the effect of the distribution of private information on prices, the null hypoth-
esis is derived from the rational expectations equilibrium. Given that there is no aggregate
uncertainty in the market, it predicts that the market price converges to the true value of
the asset independently of the distribution of private information. The corresponding alter-
native hypothesis is based on experimental evidence that the aggregation of information by
the market price is more difficult than the dissemination of information whenever markets are
incomplete (see Plott and Sunder, 1988). Hence, in the baseline environment, prices should
be closest to the rational expectations equilibrium in treatment BP. Moreover, more informed
subjects should induce a better and faster aggregation of information and, therefore, we hy-
pothesize that prices are closer to the rational expectations equilibrium in B12 than in B6.
The former statements should also be true for the manipulation environment because the
manipulator is not expected to be dominant enough to overturn this relation.
HYPOTHESIS 1: For a given environment, the market disseminates information better than
it aggregates it and the aggregation of information becomes better as the number of imperfectly
informed subjects increases.
Regarding the manipulability of the market, the null hypothesis states that the manipulation
attempt of the robot trader fails. This implies that given any distribution of information, the
last contract price – calculated conditionally on the true value of the asset – should be the
same for both environments. The alternative hypothesis, on the other hand, states that the
manipulation attempt is successful and that some of the traders fall into an information trap
yielding higher prices in the manipulation environment.5 At this point it is important to note
4We only discuss between–treatment comparisons of prices at this point. The additional within–treatment
tests presented later on reveal that the market price is positively correlated with the value of the asset. These
tests confirm therefore the very basic idea that markets are indeed able to incorporate some information in
prices and that the robot trader is not strong enough to eliminate this property. Consequently, the within–
treatment comparisons of prices constitute a lower bound to test the proper functioning of the market.
5Strictly speaking, the robot trader cannot manipulate the market when the true value of the asset is 525
ECU. But it may act as an additional competitor on the buying side of the market, which could lead to a
better aggregation of information if prices in the baseline environment fall short of the rational expectations
equilibrium.
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that not only uninformed traders but also some of the imperfectly informed subjects may
be affected by the presence of the robot trader. To clarify this point, suppose, for instance,
that true value of the asset is low. Then, the insiders with the information that the value
of the asset is not 375 ECU are particularly prone to fall into an information trap, because
the initial purchases of the manipulator may be interpreted as a signal for a high value. The
same rationale applies to subjects with the information that the asset is not worth 125 ECU
when its actual value is 375 ECU.6
HYPOTHESIS 2: For a given distribution of information, prices are higher in the manip-
ulation treatment.
3.2 Payoffs
The competing hypotheses with respect to payoffs are divided into two main parts: first,
we analyze payoff differences between distinct groups of traders (uninformed, informed, and
robot) in a given treatment. Afterwards, we check for payoff differences across treatments
for a given group of traders. To be consistent with Table 1, the latter analysis distinguishes
again whether the environment or the distribution of information is held fixed.
Regarding the within–treatment tests, the null hypothesis of the rational expectation
equilibrium implies that insiders do not earn more than uninformed traders. However, if
information is not aggregated instantaneously, as it is usually the case in experiments, the
informational advantage of the insiders should be reflected by higher payoffs in comparison
to the uninformed traders. Therefore, the main question becomes how the payoff of the robot
in a given manipulation treatment relates to the ones of the other two groups of traders.
Since the robot trader is itself uninformed, the group of uninformed traders forms a natural
peer–group for evaluating the success of the manipulator in monetary terms. Under the null
hypothesis, the noise trading does not affect prices and, therefore, the robot trader should
not earn more than the representative uninformed trader. The alternative hypothesis states
the opposite. Also note that we are silent on the payoff comparison between the robot and
the group of all insiders because it is very likely that the uninformed robot trader earns less
than the representative informed trader even if the manipulation is successful.
6We come back to this point when discussing how the payoff of different groups of traders is affected by the
manipulator.
9
HYPOTHESIS 3: In treatments M6 and MP, the payoff of the robot trader is higher than
the one of the average uninformed trader.
Now, we focus on the comparative statics with respect to the distribution of information.
We start by considering the baseline environment. According to the rational expectations
equilibrium both the informed and the uninformed subjects should earn the same in all
treatments (the fourth null hypothesis). However, if information is valuable, the payoff of
the insiders may change with the presence/absence of uninformed traders. Naturally their
payoff is lowest in the absence of uninformed traders (treatment B12), because then there
is no informational rent to be earned. Moreover, since insiders can still misjudge the value
of the asset when information is imperfect, the payoff of the informed (uninformed) subjects
should be higher (lower) in treatment BP than in treatment B6. Again, there is no particular
reason why this relationship should be overturned in the manipulation environment.
HYPOTHESIS 4: For a given environment, the payoff of the informed (uninformed) subjects
is highest (lowest) when private information is perfect.
The more interesting question is how the payoffs of insiders and uninformed traders change
due to the presence of the robot trader. Under the null hypothesis, the noise trading is not
successful and, given any distribution of information, the payoffs of uninformed and informed
traders should not be lower in the manipulation than in the corresponding baseline treatment.
Hence, the manipulator will fully account the burden of its failure.
The alternative hypothesis is explicit about who suffers and who gains in case the ma-
nipulation is successful. As it has already partly been expressed in Hypothesis 3 and in the
discussion before Hypothesis 2, not only the uninformed but also some of the imperfectly
informed traders may get affected negatively. In particular, if the value of the asset is 125
(375) ECU, the traders with the signal that the value of the asset is not 375 (125) ECU may
be misled by the manipulator. At the same time, perfectly informed insiders and traders with
the signal that the value of the asset is not 525 ECU, who should be on the selling side of
the market if the manipulation works out, would be able to earn some extra money thanks
to the higher prices. This discussion also shows that is not possible to come up with a clear
alternative hypothesis on how the payoff of the insiders as a group should be affected by the
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presence of a successful manipulator if information is imperfect.
HYPOTHESIS 5: Uninformed traders and subjects with the information that the value of
the asset is not 125 (375) ECU earn more in a baseline than in the associated manipulation
treatment. Perfectly informed insiders and traders with the signal that the value of the asset
is not 525 ECU earn more in a manipulation than in the associated baseline treatment.
4 Results
4.1 Average Price Paths
In this section, we present the results of our experiments. Figure 1 shows the average sequences
of contract prices. In order to make the data as visible as possible, it is divided into six panels
such that every column corresponds to a different value of the asset (high, middle, and low) and
every row belongs to a different environment (baseline and manipulation). The top left panel,
for instance, corresponds to the average price paths of the three baseline treatments when the
fundamental value of the asset is 525 ECU. In this panel, the continuous line corresponds to
treatment B12, the dashed line to treatment B6, and the dotted line to treatment BP.7
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Figure 1: Average price paths.
7Appendix A presents the series of contract prices for all the 36 sessions. The value of the asset for a given
round is indicated by a straight line in all panels.
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If the value of the asset is 525 (125) ECU, different distributions of information can be
clearly ranked with respect to their capacity to summarize information: independently of
the environment, convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium becomes better as we
move from six imperfectly informed to twelve imperfectly informed to four fully informed
subjects. It is also worth noticing that increasing the number of partially informed traders
has only a minor impact, while going from imperfect to perfect private information improves
the convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium substantially. In fact, in these two
states, the average last contract price is only close to the equilibrium prediction if private
information is perfect and the value of the asset is 525 ECU. Finally, since all average price
paths are almost straight lines close to the equilibrium prediction when the value of the asset
is 375 ECU, there is substantial evidence that the market disseminates information better
than it aggregates it and that the aggregation of information is to some extend positively
correlated to the number of imperfectly informed traders (Hypothesis 1).
So far, we have informally described how different distributions of information affect av-
erage prices over time, but the main research objective is to investigate whether the robot
trader is able to alter prices. Regarding this question, it can be observed that the robot
trader hardly influences the average price path if the value of the asset is either 525 or 375
ECU. If the asset is worth 125 ECU, the same observation can be made in case information
is distributed imperfectly. Things are only different when treatment BP is compared with
treatmentMP: in treatment BP, the average price path starts close to 250 ECU and decreases
slowly to about 220 ECU, where it stays from there on. The first average contract price in
treatment MP is already substantially higher and even increases for a considerable time up
to values close to 300 ECU before falling back to about 240 ECU. This is an indication that
the robot trader is able to manipulate prices if, and only if, information is perfect and the
value of the asset is low.
4.2 Statistical Analysis: Prices
In our statistical analysis, we take into account the last contract price from each round. We
proceed by calculating, for each session, the average last contract price over rounds conditional
on the value of the asset. For each treatment and for each possible value of the asset, we obtain
therefore six independent observations (one per session). The entries in Table 2 correspond to
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the average independent observation. They coincide with the last points of the average price
paths depicted in Figure 1. In continuation, we run Wilcoxon–signed rank tests (for within
treatment comparisons) and Mann–Whitney U tests (for between treatments comparisons)
on the independent observations. All reported p–values are one–sided.
High Middle Low
Baseline B6 423 384 346
B12 469 386 311
BP 512 384 213
Manipulation M6 407 394 338
M12 456 394 323
MP 524 379 237
Table 2: Average last contract prices.
Before focusing on the main hypotheses, we check whether prices and values are positively
correlated within a given treatment. In treatment M6, there is no significant difference be-
tween prices when the value of the asset is 525 and 375 ECU, respectively (p=0.1042). This
result is not caused by particularly high prices when the value of the asset is 375 ECU, as
a possible manipulation the robot trader would suggest, but rather by the poor aggregation
of information when the value of the asset is high. In fact, Table 2 reveals that the average
independent observation only amounts to 407 ECU if the value of the asset is 525 ECU.8 All
other within treatment tests lead to the intuitive conclusion that higher values lead to higher
prices (p < 0.0300, throughout).
4.2.1 The Effect of the Distribution of Information
We analyze whether the distribution of information influences the final contract price in a
given environment. Suppose first that the value of the asset is 525 ECU. We find that the
average last contract price when four subjects are perfectly informed is in both environments
significantly higher than the one when all subjects are imperfectly informed (p = 0.0386 for
the baseline and p = 0.0025 for the manipulation environment) and when six traders receive
8A detailed look at the data in Appendix A shows that information is very poorly aggregated in session 3
of treatment M6 whenever the value of the asset is high. However, this is the only session where a lower value
of the asset leads to a higher price.
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partial information (p = 0.0025 for both the baseline and the manipulation environment).
This result is rather intuitive. Since perfectly informed insiders are willing to buy the asset
at any price below 525 ECU, one would expect that competition drives the price up to
the rational expectations equilibrium. In fact, the average last contract price is 512 ECU in
treatment BP and 524 ECU in treatmentMP.9 On the other hand, if information is imperfect,
traders always bear some risk and may thus be reluctant to buy the asset at very high prices.
As a result, not all private information is aggregated by the market. Finally, we also find
that the last contract price is positively correlated with the number of imperfectly informed
traders (p = 0.0388 for the baseline and p = 0.0066 for the manipulation environment).
We now focus on the case when the value of the asset is 375 ECU. If the price of the asset is
below 375 ECU, some of the insiders will always be able to make riskless gains, independently
of the distribution of information. Consequently, the price of the asset should not be below
the rational expectations equilibrium. But the price may very well end up above 375 ECU
due to existing short-selling constraints. Wilcoxon signed–rank tests provide evidence that
the average last contract prices are not statistically significant different from the rational
expectations equilibrium in treatments BP (p=0.1807) and MP (p=0.2309). Consequently,
in this state, information is very well disseminated. Regarding treatments B6 and B12,
the statistical analysis reveals that both treatments generate prices that are significantly
higher than the equilibrium prediction (p = 0.0296 for B6 and p = 0.0180 for B12) but not
significantly different between each other (p = 0.4051). Exactly the same results are found in
the manipulation environment. The last contract price is significantly higher than 375 ECU
in M6 (p = 0.0296) and M12 (p = 0.0180) but there is no statistical difference between the
two treatments (p = 0.4051). Again, the aggregation of information turns out to be more
complicated than its dissemination.
Finally, we analyze the case when the value of the asset is 125 ECU. We observe in Table 2
that in the baseline environment, the average last contract price is the lowest in treatment BP.
The statistical analysis confirms this, because the p–values for the comparison with treatment
B6 (B12) is 0.0041 (0.0153). Also observe that the still considerable difference to the rational
expectations equilibrium in treatment BP could be caused by the absence of short–selling
opportunities. Moreover, there is statistical evidence that the average last contract price in
9The slight difference in treatment BP with respect to the equilibrium prediction stems from the fact that
the price in round 3 of session 4 is only 350.
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treatment B6 is not different from the one in treatment B12 (p = 0.1149). The very same
results are found in the manipulation environment. The p–values are 0.2352 when comparing
treatment M6 with treatment M12, 0.0065 when comparing M6 with MP, and 0.0868 when
comparing M12 with MP.
Table 3 and Result 1 summarize the results found so far.
Value Baseline Manipulation
High BP > B12 > B6 MP > M12 > M6
Middle BP = 375; 375 < B12 = B6 MP = 375; 375 < M12 = M6
Low BP < B12 = B6 MP < M6 = M12
Table 3: Price differences across treatments.
Result 1. In both environments, the market disseminates information better than it aggre-
gates information. If the value of the asset is high (not high), the aggregation of information
is better (not worse) the more imperfectly informed traders there are.
4.2.2 The Effect of the Manipulator
Our next objective is to assess the impact of the robot trader on prices. Figure 1 suggests that
the presence of the robot trader affects prices positively if, and only if, private information
is perfect and the value of the asset is low. But Table 2 only reveals a small difference
between treatment BP and treatment MP (213 vs. 237 ECU), which does not turn out to
be statistically significant (p = 0.3445). Moreover, since the p–values of all other possible
comparisons between the two environments for a fixed distribution of information lie between
0.1679 and 0.4681, we can conclude that the manipulator does not affect the last contract
price significantly.
A closer look at Figure 1 suggests above all that the convergence paths and not the final
contract prices differ across environments if the value of the asset is low and information is
perfect. In order to test for this, we consider from now on average instead of final contract
prices. The average independent observations are presented in Table 4.
We observe that if the asset has a low value, the average contract in treatmentMP is higher
than in treatment BP (303 vs. 234 ECU). This difference is statistically significant at the 5%
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High Middle Low
Baseline B6 385 379 353
B12 429 381 334
BP 476 385 234
Manipulation M6 392 385 360
M12 435 392 350
MP 488 382 303
Table 4: Average contract prices.
significance level (p = 0.0464). For all other possible comparisons, the differences between
baseline and manipulation treatments are still rather negligible. In fact, no difference is
significant at any conventional significance level.10 The following result summarizes our main
findings with respect to the manipulability of the market.
Result 2. The presence of the robot trader does not affect the last contract price. It has a
positive impact on the average contract price if, and only if, private information is perfect
and the value of the asset is low.
4.2.3 Interpretations and Implications
According to Result 1 the market disseminates information better than it aggregates informa-
tion. The aggregation of information is also positively correlated to the number of partially
informed traders if the value of the asset is 525 ECU. Since the aggregation of information
does not depend on the number of imperfectly informed subjects in the other two states, we
can confidently reject the first null hypothesis in favor of Hypothesis 1.
Result 2 offers two main implications with respect to the manipulability of the market.
First, a necessary condition is that information is perfect. Otherwise, subjects do not update
their beliefs regarding the true value of the asset upon the initial trades of the robot. Second,
the manipulability of the market also depends on the number of informed traders and the
market liquidity. In our earlier study (see Veiga and Vorsatz, 2008), where subjects were
endowed with two instead of four shares and three instead of four subjects were informed, it
10The lowest p–value (0.0737) corresponds to the comparison between the treatments M12 and B12 (392 vs.
381 ECU) when the value of the asset is 375 ECU. This result nicely captures the initial increase in the average
price path in treatment M12. Nevertheless, it is impossible to conclude that the manipulation is successful in
this case, because the price increase is not very persistent and the robot trader loses, on average, money.
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was found that the robot was able to induce a higher final contract prices if the value of the
asset was low. Here, we only find manipulations in the average contract price. Observe that
this difference should not be attributed to the fact that in the current study there are three
instead of two states. Information is very well disseminated in both environments if the value
is not 125 ECU and, therefore, the results are not caused by a potentially more complicated
experimental setup.
4.3 Statistical Analysis: Payoffs
Next, we compare the payoffs of different groups of traders (informed, uninformed, and robot)
for different distributions of information and different environments. The data is prepared as
follows: we calculate first, for each session, the average per round payoff of the representative
trader in a given group. For example, in treatment B6, we sum up the per round payoffs of
all imperfectly informed traders over the whole session and divide it by the product of the
number of imperfectly informed traders (six) and the number of rounds per session (nine).
Consequently, for each representative trader, we have six independent observations per treat-
ment. The entries in the following table are then obtained by averaging over all independent
observations. Note that the average payoff per round is equal to (125+375+525)·39 · 4 = 1366.67
ECU. This is the payoff any subject can insure herself/himself by not trading.
Robot Uninformed Insider (all types)
Baseline B6 – 1317 1416
B12 – – 1367
BP – 1274 1552
Manipulation M6 1465 1230 1487
M12 1502 – 1355
MP 1391 1238 1618
Table 5: Average payoff per round (overall).
Since insiders earn more than uninformed subjects, information is valuable. We also
observe that the robot trader turns out to be very successful. It earns not only more than
the representative trader of its natural peer–group, the group of uninformed traders, but its
payoffs is also higher than the average payoff of 1367 ECU. In fact, the payoff of the robot
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trader is higher in M12 than in M6 and, in comparison to the representative informed trader,
the robot performs better in M12, similar in M6, and worse in MP. Finally, in treatments
with both informed and uninformed subjects, the insiders seem to profit from the presence of
the robot trader, while the uninformed traders tend to have lower payoffs.
4.3.1 Within Treatment Comparisons
We start our analysis by comparing the average payoff of the group of all insiders, indepen-
dently on whether they are partially or perfectly informed, with the one of the uninformed
subjects. We find that insiders earn significantly more than uninformed subjects, the only ex-
ception is treatment B6 (p = 0.0711). In this treatment payoffs are not significantly different
from each other because three imperfectly informed subjects, who received in rounds 3 and 9
of session 2 the information that the value of the asset is not 375 ECU, bought simultaneously
a lot of shares. In this way, they created an information trap by believing that the value of
the asset was 525 ECU although, effectively, it was 125 ECU. As a consequence, the payoff of
the group of all informed traders was slightly lower than the one of the uninformed traders.
The performance of the robot trader is evaluated next. In treatment M6, the average
payoff of the robot trader is significantly higher than the one of the typical uninformed subject
(p = 0.0468). The underlying reason of this result is that the robot trader earns significantly
more than the uninformed subjects whenever the value of the asset is low (p=0.0206) and that
payoffs are not significantly different from each other in the other two states (p = 0.3412, in
both cases). Comparing the earnings of the robot trader with the one of the typical uninformed
subject in treatment MP, it turns out that the difference is not significant (p = 0.1473) even
though the manipulator earns substantially more (1391 vs. 1238 ECU). This result is due to
the fact that the robot trader is very profitable in sessions 1–3, in which manipulations are
often successful, but performs rather poor in sessions 4–6, where the manipulations fail.
Finally, we compare the payoff of the robot trader with the one of the representative
insider. In treatment M6, payoffs are not significantly different from each other (p = 0.3375),
which is already suggested by the very similar per round payoffs (1465 vs. 1487 ECU). In
treatment M12, the average per round payoff of the robot trader (1502 ECU) is higher than
the one of the average insider (1355 ECU), but the difference is not significant (p = 0.0711).
The typical insider gains substantially more than the robot trader in treatment MP (1681
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vs. 1391 ECU). This difference is again not significant (p = 0.2009), because the average per
round payoff of the robot trader is actually higher than the one of the representative insider
in sessions 1–3. For this to happen two conditions should be met: first, if the value of the
asset is 375 or 525 ECU, the dissemination of information has to be rather fast so that the
informed traders cannot profit too much from the noise trading of the robot. Second, if the
value of the asset is 125 ECU and the informed traders are on the selling side of the market,
the initial purchases of the robot have to keep up prices sufficiently long so that the robot
trader can unwind its position and still earn more than the average informed trader. The
latter is consistent with the hump–shaped average price path in the lower right panel of Figure
1 and our earlier finding that the average contract price in treatment MP is rather high if the
value of the asset is low.
Result 3. Insiders earn always more than uninformed subjects and with exception of treat-
ment B6, the difference is significant. The average per round payoff of the robot trader is
never significantly lower than the one of either the uninformed traders or the insiders and in
treatment M6, it earns significantly more than the representative uninformed subject.
4.3.2 Between Treatments Comparisons
Regarding Hypothesis 4, we analyze how the payoff of a given representative trader is affected
by changes in the distribution of private information. In treatment B12, the representative in-
formed trader earns 1367 ECU, which is, as expected, the minimum for this group of traders.
Moreover, perfect private information should allow the insiders to exploit their informational
advantage at maximum. This intuition is confirmed by the statistical analysis. The repre-
sentative informed trader earns significantly more in BP than in B12 (p = 0.0180) and B6
(p = 0.0101). The difference of 46 ECU between treatment B6 and B12 is, however, not sig-
nificant at a 5% significance level (p=0.0711). Similar results are found for the manipulation
environment. The insiders have significantly higher payoffs in MP than in M12 (p = 0.0026)
and M6 (p = 0.0153). They also earn significantly more in M6 than in M12 (p = 0.0026).
We also test whether the payoffs of the representative uninformed subject and the robot
trader change with the distribution of information. Since all p–values are higher than 0.1149,
we conclude that their payoff is not significantly affected by this treatment variable.
Result 4. The average payoff per round of the representative informed trader is highest
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(lowest) if private information is perfect (if all subjects are imperfectly informed). The average
per round payoffs of the representative uninformed subject and the robot trader do not depend
on the distribution of information.
We study next how the presence of the robot trader affects the payoff of the informed and
uninformed subjects. Table 5 shows that independently of the distribution of information,
insiders tend to earn more in the presence of the manipulator (given that also uninformed
subjects participate in the market), whereas the uninformed traders earn less. Statistically
however, only one difference is significant: if information is imperfect, the uninformed subjects
suffer from the presence of the robot trader (p = 0.0464). If, on the other hand, information is
distributed perfectly, the difference in earnings across environments for this group of traders
is not significant (p = 0.1149). Finally and regarding the representative informed trader, the
p–value is 0.0641 when comparing payoffs in treatments M6 and B6, 0.0711 for M12 and B12,
and 0.1490 for MP and BP.
Our final tests regard the question whether imperfectly informed subjects may also be
deluded by the manipulator. Table 6 clearly shows that this is not the case when there are
six imperfectly informed traders because independently of the type of information received,
insiders earn more in M6 than in B6. This also implies that all potential gains of the robot
trader are on behalf of the uninformed traders. On the other hand, if there are twelve
imperfectly informed subjects, we observe that all changes the robot trader provokes are
in the direction suggested by Hypothesis 5. Most importantly, the traders who receive the
signal that the value of the asset is not 375 ECU earn significantly less in the manipulation
environment (p = 0.0464). This result is caused by the fact that subjects with this information
earn significantly less if the true vale of the asset is 125 ECU (p = 0.0227). In fact, in this
state their average per round payoff is 339 ECU in B12 and only 5 ECU in M12. This result,
together with the earlier finding that the robot trader earns more than the average subject in
treatment M12, can therefore be taken as a hint that also imperfectly informed subjects may
fall into information traps. All other payoff differences between treatment M12 and treatment
B12 are, as it can be seen in Table 6, not significant.11
11We want to make a final comment on Table 6. Among the imperfectly informed subjects, the traders with
the information that the asset is not 525 ECU profit more from the presence of the robot trader, while those
with the information that the value of the asset is not 375 ECU profit less (suffer more). This finding is in line
with Hypothesis 5.
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Group of Traders M6 vs. B6 M12 vs. B12 MP vs. BP
Insider (all) 71 (0.0641) -12 (0.0711) 66 (0.1490)
Insider (not 525 ECU) 96 (0.1893) 118 (0.1893) –
Insider (not 375 ECU) 52 (0.3445) -157 (0.0464) –
Insider (not 125 ECU) 63 (0.3445) -10 (0.2875) –
Uninformed -87 (0.0464) – -36 (0.1149)
Table 6: Payoff differences across environments (with p–values).
Result 5. If there are twelve (six) imperfectly informed subjects, the traders with the infor-
mation that the asset is not worth 375 ECU (the uninformed traders) suffer significantly from
the presence of the robot trader.
4.3.3 Interpretations and Implications
We have seen in Result 3 that the robot trader earns always more than the average trader,
but, nevertheless, we cannot reject the third null hypothesis in favor Hypothesis 3. This is
because the payoff difference with respect to the uninformed traders is only significant in M6.
Result 3 suggests nevertheless that it is individually rational for a potential manipulator to
follow the trading strategy suggested here (and in the theoretical work of Chakraborty and
Yilmaz (2008)).
We also found that the average payoff of the representative informed subject is higher
if private information is perfect. On the other hand, the average per round payoffs of the
representative uninformed subject and the robot trader do not depend on the distribution of
information and, therefore, we cannot reject the fourth null hypothesis in favor of Hypothesis
4. Nevertheless it should be observed that the signs of the changes are consistent with
Hypothesis 4.
Finally, and most importantly, even though the uninformed subjects suffer most from the
presence of the manipulator, partially informed subject can get affected as well. Traders with
the signal that the value of the asset is not 375 ECU earn significantly less in treatment
M12 than in treatment B12. This is a new result which complements our earlier finding that
uninformed traders can be deluded by a robot if information is perfect. Consequently, the
fifth null hypothesis can be partly rejected in favor of Hypothesis 5.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied experimentally the conditions on the distribution of private infor-
mation under which a simple asset market can be manipulated by a robot trader. Our main
results with respect to the price of the asset revealed that: (i) the short–selling constrained
double auction market disseminates information better than it aggregate information, (ii)
the aggregation of information improves sometimes when the number of imperfect subjects
increases, and (iii) the intended manipulation of the robot trader is only successful when
private information is perfect and the value of the asset is low. Since the latter impact is only
significant for the average contract, this result differs from our previous findings, where we
evidenced that the last contract price was affected by the presence of the robot trader when
insiders had perfect information and the value of the asset was low (see Veiga and Vorsatz,
2008). However, the weaker effect of the manipulator in comparison to our former work can
be due to the facts that, in the present work, the market is more liquid (traders are endowed
with four instead of two shares) and that there are more perfectly informed traders in the
market (four instead of three).
Regarding payoffs we found that (i) the computer program is profitable in monetary
terms, especially in the treatment when all traders are partially informed, (ii) the uninformed
traders (insiders) have the lowest (highest) payoff if private information is perfect, and (iii)
the uninformed traders and the subjects with the signal that the value of the asset is not 375
earn less in the presence of the robot trader. The first result clearly shows that manipulations
are to be expected in this kind of market (they are individually rational), whereas the latter
establishes for the first time that also insiders may be negatively affected by the manipulator.
We regard this research as a further step in order to understand how markets aggregate
and disseminate information in the presence of manipulators. In our future research, we are
going to assess the robustness of our results with respect to the distribution of payoffs. In
case the asset is privately and not commonly valued and the market is still manipulable in
a similar way as presented here, an efficiency loss occurs. To quantify this efficiency loss is
certainly an important task.
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Appendix A: Price Paths
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Figure 2: Price development in B6.
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Figure 3: Price development in M6.
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Figure 4: Price development in B12.
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Figure 5: Price development in M12.
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Figure 6: Price development in BP.
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Figure 7: Price development in MP.
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Appendix B: Instructions (M12)
Welcome
Dear participant, thank you for taking part in this experiment. It will last about 90 minutes.
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn
some more money in addition to the 3 Euro show-up fee, which you can keep in any case.
The entire of money which you earn with your decisions will be added up and paid to you in
cash at the end of the experiment. These instructions are solely for your private information.
We will not speak of Euros during the experiment, but rather of ECU (Experimental Currency
Units). Your whole income will first be calculated in ECU. At the end of the experiment, the
total amount you have earned will be converted to Euro at the following rate:
1000 ECU = 90 Eurocents.
In order to ensure that the experiment takes place in an optimal setting, we would like to ask
you to abide to the following rules during the whole experiment:
• do not communicate with your fellow students!
• do not forget to switch off your mobile phone!
• read the instructions carefully. If something is not well explained or you have any
question now or at any time during the experiment, then ask one of the experimenters.
Do, however, not ask out loud, raise your hand instead. We will clarify questions
privately.
• you may take notes on this instruction sheet if you wish.
• after the experiment, remain seated till we paid you off.
• if you do not obey the rules, the data becomes useless for us. Therefore we will have to
exclude you from this experiment and you will not receive any compensation.
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Environment
You will learn how the experiment will be conducted later, first we introduce you to the
basic situation. You will find control questions at the end of the description that help you to
understand it better.
The Asset Market
In this experiment, you have the possibility to trade a financial asset in a stock exchange
market for a total of ten rounds. Your final income (in Euro) will be determined by the sum
of your per-round payoffs (in ECU). Every round, before the market opens for trade, the
actual liquidation value of the asset is determined. It is either 125, 375, or 525 ECU and
all values are equally likely to occur. The liquidation value is also common; that is, it is the
same for all traders. Once the market closes, you receive the liquidation value for every share
of the asset in your portfolio. For example, if the actual liquidation value of the asset is 375
ECU and you have a total of five shares of the asset, then you receive 1.875 ECU.
In the beginning of every round, every trader is endowed with four shares of the asset and
25.000 ECU. Yet, the 25.000 ECU are an interest free loan from a bank; that is, you will have
to pay them back at the end of the very same round.
Information Structure
No trader is informed about the actual liquidation value before the trading stops in the first
round of the experiment. From round two on, all traders receive some information about the
liquidation value before the market opens. In particular, everybody gets to know one of the
two values the asset does not take. Six traders learn one value the asset does not have and
six traders the other. As an example consider a situation when the actual liquidation value is
125. In this case, six traders learn that it is not 375 and six traders learn that it is not 525.
The Computer Trader
In addition to the twelve human traders there is one computer program that participates in the
market. Most importantly, the computer trader does not receive any information
with respect to the liquidation value of the asset before the market closes.
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Control Questions
Please answer the following control questions before you continue reading the instructions.
Once you have written down all your answers, please raise your hand so that one of the
experimenters can check them.
1. How many traders participate in the same market?
2. How many shares of the asset do you receive in the beginning of round 5?
3. Do you have to return your monetary endowment of 25.000 ECU at the end of the very
same round?
4. How many traders receive information with respect to the liquidation value in round 1
of the experiment?
5. How many traders receive information with respect to the liquidation value in round 9
of the experiment?
6. Does the computer trader ever receive information with respect to the liquidation value
of the asset?
7. Suppose you learn in round 5 that the liquidation value is not 525 ECU. How many
traders receive the same information as you?
8. Imagine you learn in the end of round 6 that the liquidation value of the asset is 375.
(a) If you bought one share of the asset at a price of 300 ECU, what was be your
monetary gain (in ECU) from the trade?
(b) If you bought one share of the asset at a price of 450 ECU, what was your monetary
gain (in ECU) from the trade?
9. Imagine you learn in the end of round 6 that the liquidation value is 375.
(a) If you sold one share of the asset at a price of 300 ECU, what was be your monetary
gain (in ECU) from the trade?
(b) If you sold one share of the asset at a price of 450 ECU, what was your monetary
gain (in ECU) from the trade?
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The Experiment
In the next step, we will now go over a brief instruction period so that you get used to the
computer interfaces.
The Trading Mechanism
After the determination of the liquidation value, a stock exchange market opens for 300
seconds. On the top of the corresponding computer screen you can identify the current
trading round, how long the market remains to be open, and the total amount of ECU you
have gained so far. In our example, we are in the second out of ten trading rounds, the market
remains to be open for one second, and the trader has earned 1500 ECU so far.
The screen is further divided into two main parts, the boxes on left hand side and the boxes
on the right hand side. The boxes on the left hand side provide different pieces of information
whereas the boxes on the right hand side are needed to trade the asset. At first, we introduce
the purposes of the boxes on the left hand side.
1. The box on the top is entitled Information. As it had been said before, in round one
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of the experiment no trader has information about the liquidation value of the asset.
From round two on, you will get to know one of the two values the asset does not take.
You will see each of the two possible values the asset does not have with the same
probability. In our example, the trader learns that the liquidation value is not 375.
2. The box in the middle gives you an overview about your portfolio and your cash account.
In the left part of this box, the Inventory, you find how many shares of the asset you
possess (in our example you possess 5) and how many ECU you have in your cash
account (in our example you have 24.730 ECU). The right part of the box, which is
denominated Available, has the following aim:
Any sell offer you make is binding. So, if you want to sell one share of the asset, then
you must be able to deliver it at any time in the future once the offer is accepted. To
insure this, we reduce the number of shares available to you by one whenever you place
a new sell offer. As the number of available shares is not allowed to be negative, you
can have in total at most as many standing sell offers as shares in the inventory. In
our example, the number of available shares is equal to the number of shares in the
inventory because the individual does not have any open sell offers.
A similar approach applies to the available ECU. If you want to buy one share of the
asset, then you must be able to pay for it in the future. To insure this, we reduce the
available ECU by the amount you are willing to pay whenever you place a new buy
offer. As the available ECU is not allowed to be negative, the total value of your buy
offers cannot exceed the amount of ECU in the inventory. In our example, you see on
the right hand side of the screen that the trader has two standing buy offers (the ones
marked with a star at the prices of 230 and 240 ECU). Hence, a total of 470 ECU is
subtracted from the ECU in the inventory to come up with 24.260 ECU this individual
can still use for additional buy offers.
3. The box at the bottom is called Own Trades. This box contains a list of your own
trades during a round. The most recent trade is on the top of the list. In our example,
the individual made so far one trade in this round. S/he bought one share of the asset
at a price of 270 ECU.
The boxes on the right hand side of the screen are denoted Asset Market. We are going to
explain next how the asset is bought and sold using these boxes.
1. If you want to sell one share of the asset, enter the minimum amount of ECU you
want to obtain in the field denominated Ask Price. You have to confirm your decision
by pressing the button Submit. Your offer appears immediately in the column Ask
Prices where all open sell offers are collected. The open sell offers are ordered with the
lowest ask price being on the top of the list. You can easily identify your own open sell
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offers; they are marked with the symbol *. We want to remind you that any additional
sell offer decreases the amount of available shares by one. You are allowed to withdraw
a sell offer that has not found a buyer. To do so, you only have to select the sell offer you
want to eliminate from the list and to click on the button Delete. As a consequence,
the amount of available shares rises by one again.
2. If you want to buy one share of the asset, enter the maximum amount of ECU you are
willing to pay in the field denominated Bid Price. You have to confirm your decision
by pressing the button Submit. Your offer appears immediately in the column Bid
Prices where all open buy offers are collected. The open buy offers are ordered with
the highest bid price being on the top of the list. You can easily identify your open
buy offers; they are marked with the symbol *. We remind you that any additional buy
offer decreases the amount of available ECU by the value of your bid. You are allowed
to withdraw a buy offer that has not found a seller. To do so, you only have to select
the buy offer you want to eliminate from the list and to click on the button Delete. As
a consequence, the available ECU goes up again.
3. When and how does a trade take place? A trade is possible if the highest bid
price is at least as high as the lowest ask price. In this situation, one bidder is
willing to pay for the asset at least as much as one seller asks for it. These situations
are recognized by the system and trade takes place automatically. The traded price
will be equal to the one proposed by the first of the two parties. One simple example
clarifies this: Suppose that in a certain situation the lowest ask price is 170 ECU and
that the highest bid price is 169 ECU. Then, no trade is possible. If another bidder is
willing to pay 177 ECU for the share, the only thing s/he needs to do is to enter a bid
of 177 ECU into the system following the procedure of point (2) above. The system
recognizes that a trade is possible; that is, the seller receives 170 ECU from the buyer’s
inventory (because the seller was first in the market) and the buyer receives one share
of the asset from the seller’s inventory.
An important box on the right hand side is called Traded Prices. In it, you find a list
of all prices at which a trade took place. The most recent trade price is on the top of
the list. In our example, the most recent price is 524 ECU.
Round Summary
Once the market closes, the asset is liquidated. In the corresponding computer screen you
find different pieces of information. On the left hand side of the screen you find (a) your
particular information with respect to the actual liquidation value of the asset, (b) how many
shares and how many ECU you have in your inventory, and (c) a history of your trades.
On the right hand side you find the summary statistics of this round. We inform you about the
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actual liquidation value of the asset (in our example it is 525 ECU). This value is multiplied
with the number of shares in your inventory to determine the liquidation value of your portfolio
(since the trader has five shares in her/his portfolio, the value of the portfolio is in our example
equal to 2.625 ECU). Afterwards, we add the amount of ECU in your inventory to it (the
sum is in our example equal to 27.355 ECU). Finally, we subtract the 25.000 ECU that have
been given to you in the beginning of the round as an interest free loan. As a result, we
obtain the final payoff of the round (in our example it is 2.355 ECU). This amount is added
to your earlier payoffs. For example, in the top right corner of the screen you see now that
your total current payoff is 3.855 ECU (1.500 ECU from the first plus 2.355 ECU from the
second round).
Click on the button OK to proceed to the next trading round. Note that every trader
starts again with 25.000 ECU from an interest free loan and four shares of the asset. At the
end of the last round, you will get a short electronic questionnaire regarding your personal
background. This data will only be used for statistical purposes.
FINAL QUESTION: Suppose you want to sell the asset at a price of 400. In which field do
you have to enter the price, in the ASK or in the BID cell? Once you have written down the
answer, please raise your hand.
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